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8.1 Introduction
In 2001 and 2002, a number of the United States’ best-selling prescrip-
tion pharmaceuticals—Prilosec, Prozac, Pepcid, and Claritin, for ex-
ample—faced patent expiration. What should we expect to happen as these
products approach the end of their patent product life cycle? Will switches
from prescription (Rx) to nonprescription over-the-counter (OTC) status
occur, and, if so, what will be their eﬀects on average prices and utilization?
Does the Rx-to-OTC switch signiﬁcantly mitigate the eﬀects of Rx patent
expiration on branded pharmaceutical sales? 
In this paper we address a number of issues surrounding the economic
behavior of pioneer branded pharmaceutical firms facing Rx patent ex-
piration and the consequences of generic Rx entry. We integrate retail scan-
ner transactions data with wholesale sales records and data on market-
ing eﬀorts. We focus on three main sets of issues: (a) pricing and marketing
strategies by branded pioneer drug manufacturers on their Rx drugs before
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of any institutions with which they are related, or of any research sponsor.and after patent expiration; (b) the impact of generic Rx entry on the price,
utilization, and revenues of the Rx molecule after patent expiration; and (c)
the eﬀects of Rx-to-OTC switches on cannibalization of same-brand Rx
sales and on total (Rx plus OTC) brand sales. Although the ﬁrst two sets of
issues can be addressed using traditional data sources for pharmaceuticals,
the third set of issues requires use of OTC data, data now available from
scanned retail transactions. 
To assess the more general impacts of generic Rx entry and Rx-to-OTC
switches on prices and utilization, it is necessary to construct aggregate
price indexes that incorporate these introductions of new goods. In this con-
text, alternative ways of introducing new goods into price indexes have been
proposed by Feenstra (1994, 1997) and by Griliches and Cockburn (1994).
In this paper we compare these two price index approaches in terms of their
data and modeling requirements, robustness of empirical results, and plau-
sibility of empirical ﬁndings.
As best we can determine, the research we report here is the ﬁrst system-
atic empirical examination of the interactions between Rx and OTC ver-
sions of “sunset” branded pharmaceuticals as they face Rx patent expira-
tion.1 In this study we focus on the U.S. market segments for antiulcer and
heartburn drugs, which are large and in the last decade have experienced
both patent expiration and extensive OTC introductions. We examine how
the various product life cycle forces have operated in this market segment
over the last decade. Our research integrates data from various sources,
such as prescription drug sales data from IMS Health, as well as scanner
OTC retail transactions data from Information Resources Inc. (IRI). 
8.2 Background
In 1977 SmithKline introduced a pharmaceutical product branded Taga-
met (a histamine2-receptor antagonist, chemical name cimetidine) into the
U.S. market. Tagamet promotes the healing of ulcers by blocking receptors
on parietal cells that stimulate acid production, thereby reducing the secre-
tion of stomach acid. The introduction of Tagamet marked the beginning
of a new medical era in which ulcers were treated pharmacologically on an
outpatient basis, rather than on the traditional inpatient basis, which had
involved more costly hospitalizations and surgeries. 
In the following years, a number of additional new histamine2-receptor
antagonist (hereafter, H2) launches occurred, ﬁrst involving Zantac (raniti-
dine, introduced by Glaxo in 1983), then Pepcid (famotidine, by Merck in
1986), and ﬁnally Axid (nizatidine, by Eli Lilly in 1988). Since their intro-
ductions, the four H2s have expanded medical uses far beyond just the treat-
ment of existing ulcers. For example, over the last two decades the Food and
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1. For earlier empirical research on Rx-to-OTC switches, see Temin (1992).Drug Administration (FDA) has approved use of the H2s for the treatment
of hypersecretory conditions and gastroesophageal reﬂux disease (“GERD,”
a common but severe form of heartburn); for the prevention of stress ulcers;
for long-term maintenance therapy for the prevention of duodenal and gas-
tric ulcer recurrence; and for the treatment and prevention of episodic heart-
burn, acid indigestion, and sour stomach. The H2s have also been often pre-
scribed to oﬀset stomach-related side eﬀects from other medications, as well
as from anesthesia and radiological and chemotherapy treatments.2
Aided by patent protection, the widespread utilization of the H2s resulted
in spectacular revenue growth for their manufacturers. In the early to mid-
1990s, for example, not only was Zantac the number one dollar sales volume
prescription drug in the United States, but Tagamet was typically in the top
ten, and Pepcid and Axid were also usually among the ﬁfty or so best-selling
prescription drugs. 
The H2s revolutionized medical treatments for gastrointestinal disorders.
However, they soon faced forces of creative destruction in the form of a new
and sometimes superior generation of drugs for the treatment of ulcers and
GERD, namely the proton pump inhibitors (PPIs).3 The more potent PPIs
suppress acid secretion by directly inhibiting the acid-producing pump sys-
tem of the parietal cell, have very few side eﬀects, and have convenient once-
a-day dosing. 
The ﬁrst PPI on the U.S. market was Prilosec (omeprazole, renamed
Prilosec in 1990 after initially being branded Losec by Merck in 1989); then
came Prevacid (lansoprazole, by TAP-Abbott in May 1995), Aciphex
(rabeprazole, by Janssen in August 1999), and Protonix (pantoprazole, by
Wyeth Ayerst in May 2000). Concerned about safety and risks from long-
term use of the potent Prilosec, initially the FDA only approved its use for
short-term treatment. However, after reviewing long-term use evidence, in
March 1995 the FDA permitted Prilosec to remove the “black box” warn-
ing in its product labeling regarding possible risks from long-term use, and
in June 1995 the FDA explicitly granted long-term maintenance use ap-
proval for Prilosec. 
Although the H2s provide eﬀective treatments for many individuals, in
some cases the PPIs are even better. For example, at the time of its obtain-
ing initial marketing approval in May 1995, the manufacturer of Prevacid
was permitted by the FDA to claim superiority over ranitidine (then the
most prescribed H2) for the treatment of heartburn (Electronic Orange
Book 2000). 
With long-term safety issues settled, and superiority over the H2s estab-
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2. For more detailed discussions of the H2 market up until 1994, see Berndt et al. (1995,
1997).
3. A London Business School case study dealing with how the H2 manufacturers could re-
spond to competition from the new PPIs is that by Dell’Osso (1990). Also see Perloﬀ and Sus-
low (1994).lished, the PPIs were marketed intensively beginning in the mid-1990s. Re-
markably, sales of the PPIs exceeded even those of the record-setting H2s.
By 1997, for example, Prilosec had overtaken Zantac as the United States’
(and the world’s) largest revenue prescription drug, and by 1999, Prevacid
ranked not far behind.4
In addition to intense rivalry from the next-generation PPIs, the H2s also
faced imminent loss of patent protection. Tagamet’s patent was the ﬁrst to
expire, on 17 May 1994, and after considerable litigation, Zantac’s market
exclusivity was terminated in late July 1997. 
In this context, one speciﬁc provision of the Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984
was particularly important to the H2prescription drug manufacturers in the
1990s. This provision granted pioneer manufacturers an additional three
years of limited market exclusivity, if they obtained FDA approval for a new
presentation and indication for the chemical entity.5 As early as a decade
before its anticipated patent expiration, SmithKline discussed with the
FDA the possibility of its seeking and gaining approval for an OTC version
of Tagamet for the treatment of heartburn.6 By timing the OTC launch to
coincide approximately with the pioneer Rx patent expiration date, Smith-
Kline could potentially benefit from an additional three years of market
exclusivity on the OTC version of Tagamet, thereby oﬀsetting somewhat
its loss of post–patent expiration Rx sales. Consumers, not just branded
manufacturers, might also enjoy welfare gains from Rx-to-OTC switches.
Speciﬁcally, provided the OTC drug is safe, consumers could beneﬁt by hav-
ing access to an eﬀective medication without incurring the time and dollar
costs of obtaining a physician’s prescription (Rx).7
This provision of the Waxman-Hatch Act created clear incentives for
SmithKline, the manufacturer of the pioneer H2 Tagamet, to be the ﬁrst to
switch from Rx to OTC. However, the later H2Rx entrants (Zantac, Pepcid,
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4. That Prilosec even made it to the market was remarkable, since its Swedish developers
nearly terminated research on it several times, viewing its research program as a likely failure.
For a history of its development, see Eliasson and Eliasson (1997).
5. See Section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 USC Section 355
(c)(3)(B)(iii). Empirical analyses of the eﬀect of the Waxman-Hatch Act include those by
Grabowski and Vernon (1992); Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz (1991); and Frank and Salkever
(1997). For a historical overview of FDA regulation of the drug industry prior to 1980, see
Temin (1980).
6. For a Harvard Business School case study discussion of the race to develop and launch
the ﬁrst OTC H2 in the United States, see King et al. (2000).
7. For discussions of possible beneﬁts and costs to consumers, manufacturers, and insurance
providers from the Rx-to-OTC switch, see Hesselgrave (“Will Managed Care Embrace Rx-to-
OTC Switches?” Drug Topics, 2 June 1997), Jaroﬀ (“Fire in the Belly, Money in the Bank,”
Time, 6 November 1995, 56–58), McCarthy (1999), Tanou and Burton (“More Firms ‘Switch’
Prescription Drugs to Give Them Over-the-Counter Status,” Wall Street Journal,29 July 1993,
B1), and Temin (1983, 1992). More general discussions of consumers’ response to drug prices,
and the factors aﬀecting substitution between Rx and OTC drugs, are found in, inter alia, Lei-
bowitz (1989); Leibowitz, Manning, and Newhouse (1985); O’Brian (1989); Phelps and New-
house (1974); and Stuart and Grana (1995).and Axid) also had incentives to launch OTC versions of their Rx products,
particularly if late OTC entry meant forgoing potentially large OTC sales.
For the later Rx entrants, OTC entry could possibly occur even prior totheir
own Rx patent expiration. All H2 manufacturers realized that the order of
exit from patent protection in the Rx market need not be the same as the or-
der of entry into the OTC market, nor would ﬁrst-mover advantages in the
Rx market necessarily transfer to the OTC environment.8
Moreover, in implementing an Rx-to-OTC switch, pharmaceutical ﬁrms
had to consider two possible oﬀsetting forces. Branded Rx manufacturers
needed to account for the possible cannibalization of sales of their branded
Rx product that could result by introducing a same-brand OTC variant. On
the other hand, positive spillovers could result from increased brand aware-
ness when both OTC and Rx same-brand products were marketed simulta-
neously. Would positive spillover or negative cannibalization eﬀects domi-
nate?9
Two of the four H2 brands (Tagamet and Zantac) lost patent protection
in the 1990s, and the other two brands (Axid and Pepcid) lost patent pro-
tection in 2001. All four have implemented Rx-to-OTC switches. Thus the
variation among the H2s, over time, should enable us to quantify the im-
portance of the various factors aﬀecting sales of these molecules. Moreover,
Prilosec, currently the best-selling drug in the world, is scheduled to lose
U.S. market exclusivity and face generic competition some time in 2002, al-
though ongoing litigation currently leaves the precise date of Prilosec
patent expiration uncertain. Thus an examination of the recent historical
record involving the H2s could yield insights into what developments to ex-
pect in the market for the PPIs as patent protection ends and, possibly, as
Rx-to-OTC switches occur for the PPIs as well.
The remainder of this chapter continues as follows. In section 8.3 we re-
view conceptual bases that provide hypotheses involving pricing and mar-
keting as Rx brands face Rx generic competition. Then in section 8.4 we
describe alternative methodologies for incorporating generic and OTC
products (“new goods”) into various aggregate price indexes. In section 8.5
we discuss data sources and the construction and interpretation of various
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8. On ﬁrst-mover advantages and their rationale in the market for pharmaceuticals, see
Bond and Lean (1977), Berndt et al. (1995, 1997), King (2000), and King et al. (2000). The the-
oretical foundations and empirical evidence on ﬁrst-mover advantages in other markets are
discussed in, among others, Robinson, Kalyanaram, and Urban (1994); Samuelson and Zeck-
hauser (1988); Schmalensee (1982); and Urban et al. (1986).
9. It is interesting to note that when joining up with or creating joint ventures with the more
retail-oriented consumer product companies, the Rx drug manufacturers also created canni-
balization possibilities for the traditional antacids used to treat heartburn. For example, for
SmithKline Beecham, OTC Tagamet competed with its OTC antacid products, Tums and
Gaviscon. For Glaxo Wellcome, pairing with Warner-Lambert meant that OTC Zantac would
compete with OTC Rolaids. Finally, for the J&J•Merck joint venture, the OTC Pepcid would
compete with OTC Mylanta and Imodium. Ling (1999) provides an empirical analysis of the
interactions among the incumbent OTC antacid and the newer OTC H2 products.price and quantity measures, ﬁrst for prescription drugs and then for OTCs.
With this as background, in section 8.6 we present a number of stylistic facts
that appear to characterize these markets in anticipation of and following
Rx patent protection, and we provide some preliminary evidence on our hy-
potheses. We discuss our price index results in section 8.7. Finally, in section
8.8 we summarize and conclude.
8.3 Conceptual Foundations and Testable Hypotheses
The existing literature in economics and marketing provides a conceptual
basis for a number of hypotheses. We ﬁrst address pricing by branded Rx
ﬁrms in response to generic competition. Frank and Salkever (1992, 1997)
demonstrate that under certain conditions, a proﬁt-maximizing branded
pioneer may not lower (and may even increase) price in response to generic
competition. The branded ﬁrm must be able to segment its market into sets
of brand-loyal consumers, who will continue to purchase the product, and
price-sensitive consumers, who will migrate to the lower-cost generics.10
Other things being equal, the larger the brand-loyal segment is relative to
the price-sensitive segment, the greater the branded pioneer’s post–patent
expiration price. The magnitude and speed of the price response by the
branded pioneer following patent expiration is, however, an empirical issue.
We  hypothesize that branded ﬁrms will not lower Rx prices following
patent expiration.11
Economic theory provides some very useful general guidance and intu-
ition on marketing eﬀorts by branded ﬁrms. In particular, as enunciated by
Dorfman and Steiner (1954), for proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms facing down-
ward-sloping demand curves and having market power such as that pro-
vided by patent protection, the optimal ratio of marketing expenditures to





















where εM is the elasticity of demand with respect to marketing eﬀorts, and
εP is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand.12
There is considerable evidence that early in the product life cycle phar-
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10. On this, also see Scherer (1993, 2000), Griliches and Cockburn (1994), and Ellison et al.
(1997).
11. Empirical evidence presented in Frank and Salkever (1997) and Berndt, Cockburn, and
Griliches (1996) is consistent with the Frank-Salkever segmented market hypothesis. Related
econometric evidence from Berndt, Griliches, and Rosett (1993) suggests that over the 1986–
91 time period, prices of older drugs increased more rapidly than those of newer products.
12. The original Dorfman-Steiner formulation was in the context of static optimization. Ex-
tensions to dynamic optimization are presented in Schmalensee (1972). Most of the intuition
generalizes to the dynamic environment. For additional discussions, see Hurwitz and Caves
(1988) and Leﬄer (1981).maceutical marketing eﬀorts involving physician detailing and medical
journal advertising provide long-lived beneﬁts in the form of additional cur-
rent and future sales; that is, evidence suggests that up to the mature phase
of the product life cycle, εMis positive and signiﬁcant. Moreover, εMis larger
in the long run than over the short term. The substantial amount of mar-
keting commonly observed at the time of initial product launch is of course
consistent with large and long-lived sales impacts from such marketing
eﬀorts (see, e.g., Berndt et al. 1995, 1997; Perloﬀ and Suslow 1994; King
2000). 
However, as patent expiration approaches, one expects that branded
manufacturers anticipate a decline in εM, because lower-priced generic en-
trants could instead capture a large portion of sales from additional mar-
keting (on this, see also Ellison and Ellison 2000). If this is true, branded
manufacturers would reduce their current marketing-to-sales ratio in antic-
ipation of patent expiration. Notice that if marketing eﬀorts were not long-
lived, one might instead expect them to occur unabated until the day of
patent expiration. Once patent expiration actually occurs, not only would
εM likely fall further, but it is also reasonable to expect that price competi-
tion would intensify, increasing εP, the denominator of the right side of
equation (1), and thereby further reducing the ratio of marketing-to-sales.
We hypothesize, therefore, that the pioneer’s marketing-sales ratio will fall
as patent expiration approaches, and it may even approach zero after patent
expiration occurs. Because any single generic entrant ﬁnds it diﬃcult to ap-
propriate any sales beneﬁts from marketing of the molecule, for generic
ﬁrms we expect εM to be very small. The intense price competition among
generics implies a large εP. Hence, we hypothesize that generic manufactur-
ers will have marketing-sales ratios close to zero, where marketing eﬀorts
consist of physician detailing and medical journal advertising.13
8.4 Alternative Procedures for Incorporating 
New Goods into Price Indexes
For the purpose of assessing impacts of generic Rx entry and Rx-to-OTC
new product introductions, it is useful to construct price indexes aggregated
up to the level of a molecule (including both generic and brand Rx), or a
brand level (including both Rx and OTC versions). Theoretical and empir-
ical discussions of alternative methodologies for constructing an aggregate
price index over generic and brand Rx drugs are found in Feenstra (1997)
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13. Generic ﬁrms may, however, engage in other marketing eﬀorts for which the beneﬁts are
more easily internalized. Generic ﬁrms market very diﬀerently from brand ﬁrms. Instead of
engaging in detailing and journal advertising, generic ﬁrms tend to have home oﬃce major ac-
count representatives for particular customers, such as drugstore chains, staﬀ model managed
care organizations, and mass merchandisers such as Wal-Mart. Unfortunately, we have no
data on these types of marketing eﬀorts.and in Griliches and Cockburn (1994; hereafter GC).14Griliches and Cock-
burn assume a uniform distribution of reservation prices across heteroge-
neous consumers between the brand and generic prices at the time of patent
expiration, and they thereby obtain an average reservation price midway be-
tween the brand and generic price. Their price index method employs post–
generic entry data only. Feenstra’s method involves inferring the elasticity
of substitution from aggregate expenditure variations pre– and post–patent
expiration, and it has the beneﬁt of not requiring estimation of a reservation
price. In this chapter, in addition to examining these issues in the more gen-
eral context of Rx-to-OTC switches (not just brand-generic drugs after
patent expiration), we will assess the sensitivity of alternative price index
calculations to the choice of functional form, to the complexity of model-
ing requirements, and to the inclusion of nonprice regressors.
Both the Feenstra and GC procedures are based on the economic theory
of consumer demand. In the context of the Rx drug market, principal-agent
issues involving physicians and patients, as well as moral hazard considera-
tions resulting from the presence of insurance coverage, complicate matters
considerably. Price comparisons between OTC and Rx versions of the same
molecule are also more complex to interpret when the Rx version is covered
by insurance whereas the OTC is not. Thus, although we make no attempt
to incorporate such complications here, we caution that many of the tradi-
tional relationships between welfare calculations and price index move-
ments are unlikely to hold in the Rx and OTC markets.
Following Feenstra’s notation, we denote total expenditures on a mole-
cule by E, price by P, the change operator by  , and the positive price elas-
ticity of demand by  . Since  E   –(  – 1)  P, it follows that







where   0. Feenstra’s insight is that if data on  E were available and if  
were known, then one could simply use equation (2) to obtain an estimate
of  P consistent with consumer preferences, without requiring knowledge
of the reservation price of the generic drug. Feenstra suggests estimating  
simultaneously with parameters of the price index P, as described below.
Assuming that diﬀerent molecules are imperfect substitutes, Feenstra
speciﬁes a simple log-log demand equation for molecule i having the form
(3) ln Qi
t    i –  i ln Pi
t  ∑
i j
 j ln Pj
t    i ln It   εi
t,
for periodst  0, 1, . . . , T, where Qiand P i are quantity (in grams) and price
per gram of the ith molecule, P j is the price of imperfect substitutes for the
ith molecule, I is total expenditures across the various molecules, and εi is a
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14. Feenstra’s (1997) work builds on that in Feenstra (1994) and Feenstra and Shiells (1997).random disturbance term. When i and j are substitutes, the  j are positive.
Also, as long as i is not an inferior good, we expect the  i to be positive.
To incorporate brand-generic substitutability within a given molecule,
Feenstra assumes the existence of a unit expenditure function that is weakly
separable from other molecules (and other goods) and that is consistent
with aggregation of tastes over heterogeneous consumers. When a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) unit expenditure assumption is assumed
(which can be derived from a linear random utility model in which each
consumer has diﬀering additive utility over the varieties available), Feenstra
shows that the exact price index in period t (after the generic is introduced)
relative to time period 0 (just prior to the generic introduction) is
(4) Pi







b   (1 – st
ig)1/( i–1)
where pib is the per gram price of the branded version of molecule i, sig is the
revenue share of the generic, and  i is the elasticity of substitution between
generic and branded versions of molecule i, with  i   1. The elasticity of
substitution  i is obtained by estimating parameters in the equation


















     ui
t
where sib is the brand revenue share, pig is the per gram price of the generic
version of molecule i, and uiis a random disturbance term. Feenstra also de-
rives estimating equations in the case of a translog unit expenditure func-
tional form. To save on space, we do not discuss translog forms further here;
their extension is straightforward.
Notice that in order that the area above price but under the demand curve
(consumers’ surplus) be ﬁnite, it is required that the  i elasticities of substi-
tution between brand and generic versions of a molecule be greater than 1.
In the current context, since there are only two goods (brand and generic
drugs), and quantity demanded is homogeneous of degree zero in prices,
this elasticity of substitution restriction is tantamount to requiring de-
mands to be own-price elastic. Intuitively, when the price of good iincreases
with pj ﬁxed, eventually as quantity demanded of good i approaches zero,
the proportional decline in quantity of good i must be greater than its price
increase, else the demand curve would not intersect the vertical price axis
(the reservation price would not be ﬁnite). When  i > 1, the CES function
satisﬁes this condition globally. However, if any of the elasticities of substi-
tution  i are less than or equal to unity, at any positive price the amount of
consumers’ surplus (and the reservation price) will be inﬁnite. It is worth
emphasizing that both the GC and Feenstra approaches to aggregate price
index construction in the context of the introduction of a new good share
this substitution elasticity constraint.
To  implement the CES framework empirically, Feenstra substitutes
The Long Shadow of Patent Expiration 237equation (4) into equation (3), normalizes a “real” expenditure index rela-
tive to the price of the branded drug,
Q ~
i














and then obtains an estimating equation nonlinear in the parameters, of the
form
(6) ln Q ~
i


































      i ln It   εi
t,
where i   j. Notice that estimation of the within-molecule and between-
molecule substitution elasticities is accomplished using data from both the
pre– and post–generic entry time periods.
The alternative, simpler methodology suggested by GC is to estimate
within-molecule brand-generic substitutability employing only post–
generic entry data, using data on, for example, the CES revenue share equa-
tion (5). These elasticity estimates are then inserted into equation (4) to ob-
tain exact price indexes.
Feenstra (1997) argues that his approach has two advantages over that of
GC. First, it makes use of a longer time series of data, and, second, it is more
robust empirically to the choice of functional form when applied to
monthly October 1984–September 1990 U.S. data on two anti-infective
drugs. We assess both procedures here in a rather diﬀerent context—the H2
market for two types of new goods, generic and OTC drugs, based on data
primarily from the 1990s. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst consider construction of ag-
gregate price indexes with generic entry into the Rx H2market, and then we
aggregate further to consider the impacts of OTC entry in the total H2mar-
ket (Rx brand, Rx generic, and OTC), using monthly data from the time
period January 1989–December 1998.
8.4.1 Rx  H2 Market Only, Brands, and Generic Entry
Of the four molecules in the Rx H2 market, two (cimetidine and raniti-
dine) experienced generic entry during the 1989–99 time period analyzed.
We  therefore specify two estimable equations embodying both within-
(brand-generic) and between-molecule (cimetidine, ranitidine, Pepcid, and
Axid) substitutability, based on a CES unit expenditure function. We also
experiment with introducing additional explanatory variables into the mol-
ecule demand equations (e.g., marketing eﬀorts), but only in a preliminary
way, because an extensive demand analysis is beyond the scope of the cur-
rent study. 
The relatively simple equations take the form
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i














i   ln(1 – st































b       i ln It   εi
t
where i   cimetidine (brand name Tagamet) or ranitidine (brand name
Zantac); j, k, and l denote the other H2-antagonist molecules; and It is total
expenditures on all four molecules (both brand and generic, where appli-
cable). 
Assuming a CES unit expenditure assumption, for the GC framework
the two estimating equations have the considerably simpler form
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t
where i   cimetidine or ranitidine, b refers to the Rx brand, and g refers to
the Rx generic. Although in principle equation (8) could be generalized
to incorporate data on relative brand-generic marketing eﬀorts, in fact
generics’ traditional marketing eﬀorts are essentially zero.
8.4.2 Total  H2 Market with OTC Entry
The exact price indexes obtained for the cimetidine and ranitidine Rx H2
molecules can now be employed in a larger context in which aggregate mol-
ecule price indexes are constructed consistent with imperfect substituta-
bility between OTC and Rx versions of the same H2 molecule. Recall that
during our 1989–99 sample period, all four H2 Rx drugs implemented
same-brand introductions of OTC versions. 
With a CES unit expenditure function deﬁned over Rx and OTC versions
of the same H2molecule in the Feenstra approach, the four estimating equa-
tions take the form
(9) ln Q ~
i


































      i ln It
rc   εi
t.
Here, pir is the estimated price index of the Rx version of the molecule i (as
calculated in section 8.5.1 below) when i   cimetidine or ranitidine, but pir
is the price index of the branded Rx version of molecule i when i   Pepcid
or Axid, because Rx Pepcid and Rx Axid did not lose patent protection and
thus did not face generic entry during the 1989–98 time period of our study.
The revenue share of the OTC version of the molecule i is sic, and in this
broader context  iis the elasticity of substitution between Rx and OTC ver-
sions of molecule i,  i   1. The index j denotes the imperfect substitutes for
The Long Shadow of Patent Expiration 239molecule i. Hence, pjr is the estimated price index of the Rx version of the
molecule j, as calculated in section 8.5.1, when j   cimetidine or ranitidine.
However, pir is the price index of the branded Rx version of molecule j if j  
Pepcid or Axid. The revenue share of the OTC version of molecule j is sjc,
and  jis the elasticity of substitution between Rx and OTC versions of mol-
ecule j. The total expenditure across the Rx and OTC versions of the mole-
cules is Irc, and εi is a random disturbance term. These four equations are
nonlinear in the parameters and contain numerous cross-equation restric-
tions. 
With the GC approach based on the CES unit expenditure function, the
four estimating equations take the relatively simple form
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where the notation is the same as above. Below we undertake empirical
analyses of equations (9) and (10), adding measures of relative cumulative
marketing eﬀorts as additional demand-shifters.
8.5 Data Sources, Descriptions, and Interpretations
Our framework requires integrating data from a number of diverse
sources, which we now brieﬂy summarize. We begin with prescription drugs
and then discuss the OTCs.
8.5.1  Prescription Drug Markets
Quantity shipped, revenue, and marketing data for antiulcer and heart-
burn prescription drugs are taken from IMS Health, monthly from January
1988 through June 1999. IMS Health’s Retail PerspectiveTMtracks monthly
shipments from manufacturers and wholesalers to retail warehouses and
outlets. The data on revenues include those to manufacturers and whole-
salers but not to the retail outlets (which add retail margins). Although rev-
enues are net of chargebacks (discounts given purchasers and channeled
through wholesalers), rebates (payments made to providers who often do
not take title to the pharmaceuticals, e.g., managed care organizations) are
not included in the IMS revenue data, nor are prompt payment discounts.
The exclusion of rebates from the revenue data implies an overstatement of
manufacturers’ Rx revenues and prices. The extent of this bias is unknown,
because data on rebates tend to be highly proprietary. In spite of this draw-
back in the IMS data, however, most branded and generic pharmaceutical
companies purchase and utilize the IMS data for their internal research. In-
dustry oﬃcials have indicated to us that although the absolute prices and
revenues are likely to be upward biased, there is no reason to believe any
bias carries over to relative prices and revenues.
Information on quantity shipped and revenue is at the level of presenta-
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tablets. We convert these presentational sales measures into quantity or unit
data by using the recommended daily dosage for active duodenal ulcer
treatment as the transformation factor. The resulting quantity data can
then be interpreted as the hypothetical patient days of therapy per month
were  all patients taking the recommended active duodenal ulcer daily
dosage.15 Data on recommended daily dosages are taken from the Physi-
cians’ Desk Reference (2000). Price per day of therapy is then computed as
revenues divided by the quantity of therapy days in that month. Further de-
tails on price, quantity, and revenue measurement are found in the data ap-
pendix of Berndt et al. (1997).
The price and quantity data we employ only cover Rx sales into drug-
stores. Drugstore sales constitute on average about 70–80 percent of sales
in all outlets but exclude sales to hospitals, long-term care facilities, and
mail-order distributors (IMS Health 1998). Because hospital usage and
marketing diﬀer considerably from the outpatient environment, we conﬁne
our attention here to transactions occurring in the traditional retail sector.
To  measure marketing eﬀorts involving visits by pharmaceutical sales
representatives (“detailers”) to physicians’ oﬃces, we employ IMS Health
data from its Oﬃce Contact ReportTM. Basing its data on a panel of about
3,800 physicians who report the number of visits and minutes spent with de-
tailers discussing particular products, IMS extrapolates monthly detailing
eﬀorts by drug to the national level. Using an estimated cost per detailing
visit, IMS also estimates total detailing expenditures.
Medical journal advertising pages and expenditures are estimated by
IMS in its National Journal AuditTM. This audit includes journal pharma-
ceutical advertising directed to practitioners in all types of medical practice,
including pharmacists, nurses, podiatrists, and dentists, as well as medical
and osteopathic practitioners. Based on circulation, the number of square
inches, pages of advertisements, and copy characteristics such as premium
positioning and the number of colors in each advertisement, IMS uses stan-
dard rate sheets from over 300 major medical journals to estimate total dol-
lars of journal advertising, monthly, by drug. Further details on these mar-
keting measures can be found in the data appendix of Berndt et al. (1997)
and in IMS Health (1998).
The Rx H2 antagonists have been marketed not only to physicians but
also, more directly, to consumers. In the context of Rx-to-OTC switches, di-
rect-to-consumer (DTC) marketing of Rx products permits manufacturers
to build up consumer brand awareness in anticipation of the future launch
of OTC variants. In the mid-1980s Tagamet Rx had a “Tommy Tummy”
The Long Shadow of Patent Expiration 241
15. The transformation factors are: Tagamet (cimetidine), 800 mg/day; Zantac (ranitidine),
300 mg/day; Pepcid, 40 mg/day; Axid, 300 mg/day; Prilosec, 20 mg/day; Prevacid, 30 mg/day;
and Propulsid, 40 mg/day. Since Propulsid never had FDA approval for active duodenal ulcer
treatment, we use the recommended daily dosage for treatment of nocturnal GERD.DTC marketing campaign, and later in the early 1990s Glaxo launched an
extensive TV and print DTC campaign for Zantac. In 1997 the FDA clari-
ﬁed regulations on the content of DTC ads. Increases in DTC marketing of
Rx drugs were steady during the 1990s.16
Data on DTC marketing of Rx brands from Leading National Advertis-
ers (LNA)/Media Watch Multi-Media Service is published on a quarterly
basis by Competititve Media Reporting. This service reports Rx brand ad-
vertising expenditure estimates in ten major media: consumer magazines,
Sunday magazines, newspapers, outdoor advertising, network television,
spot television, syndicated television, cable television, network radio, and
national spot radio. The LNA/Media Watch Multi-Media Service includes
only brands of companies spending a total of $25,000 or more year-to-date
in the ten media measured. The data we employ are taken from Class D21X,
which reports advertising expenditures by company and then lists brands
for each company. Currently our DTC data are available only through
1998:4. To transform the quarterly data into monthly periodicity, we em-
ploy the Stata command “ipolate.”17The monthly expenditure data are then
deﬂated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Advertising Agency Producer
Price Index to convert them into constant-dollar ﬁgures.18
8.5.2  Over-the-Counter Drug Markets
Quantity and revenue data for the OTC H2 market are taken from
InfoScanTM, based on store-level optical scanner data purchased and col-
lected from multiple retail outlets by IRI.19These scanner data are collected
weekly from more than 29,000 chain drugstores, mass merchandisers, food
stores, and chain convenience stores located in major metropolitan areas
and rural areas. They are then projected to national levels for these chains.
The IRI data provide detailed information on sales, pricing, and promotion
on a stock-keeping unit basis. The volume of sales is recorded for each pack-
age size of each brand on an average weekly basis. The weekly data are ag-
gregated to the monthly level.
To establish comparable units of consumption for Rx and OTC products,
we aggregate the data for each OTC brand across presentations and re-
gional outlets so that the quantity measure reﬂects the total milligrams sold
each month nationally. For instance, if 5,000 packages of Tagamet HB each
with twenty-ﬁve tablets of 200 mg cimetidine are sold, we compute the to-
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16. On this, see Rosenthal et al. (2002).
17. See Stata Corporation (1999).
18. For July 1995 onward (when the deﬂators ﬁrst became available), we construct this de-
ﬂator as the arithmetic average of the Producer Price Index for “Advertising agencies, ad cre-
ation, billed separately,” and “Advertising agencies, media placement, including ad creation
not billed.” For months prior to July 1995, we employ the Producer Price Index for all ﬁnished
goods.
19. See Information Resources Inc. (1997), Guadagni and Little (1983), and Bucklin and
Gupta (1999). The IRI website is [http://www.infores.com].tal number of mg of Tagamet HB sold that month as 5000 × 25 × 200   25
million mg. Unlike the IMS Health data on Rx sales to drugstores, the IRI
data record sales from drugstores, mass merchandisers, and food stores to
consumers, so the IRI data include both wholesale and retail margins.
Moreover, whereas the IMS data reﬂect inventory stocking behavior by, for
example, chain drugstore warehouses, the IRI data only include actual
transactions to ﬁnal consumers. 
To make the quantity units of the various OTC H2 brands comparable
with each other, we normalize the total number of milligrams per brand sold
each month by the daily dosage recommended to treat active duodenal ul-
cers.20 Although we describe our quantity measure as patient days of ther-
apy, in fact this is not literally true. Both the Rx and OTC versions are used
for the treatment of a number of related disorders, often at varying dosages,
and by individuals having diﬀerent body masses.21Rather, the quantity mea-
sures should be interpreted as the number of patient days of therapy that
would be consumed were all the OTC H2s used for the treatment of active
duodenal ulcers at recommended Rx dosages. It is worth emphasizing that
we do not wish to imply or suggest here that any or all patients actually
(mis)use the OTC H2s to treat active duodenal ulcers.22 We make this trans-
formation solely for the purpose of standardizing units of active ingredient.
Once quantity units are calculated, we divide total revenues by quantity,
thereby obtaining a price per patient day of therapy. Both the revenue and
price OTC data reﬂect the impacts of periodic “sales” and discounts as well
as the eﬀects of coupons redeemed by consumers at the time of the retail
transaction.
Over-the-counter medications have been marketed intensively to con-
sumers. For example, between 1990 and 1996 for the seven largest-selling
antacid OTC products in 1994, the median real ratio of advertising to retail
sales was approximately 34 percent.23 To obtain measures of monthly ad-
vertising of the OTC H2s, we employ data from Leading National Adver-
tisers/Media Watch Multi-Media Service. Leading National Advertisers
distinguishes consumer-oriented OTC brand advertising from that for Rx
brands. Quarterly data on media advertising over the ten media mentioned
earlier for the H2OTC brands are taken from Class D213, over-the-counter
digestive aids and antacids. Currently these data are only available to us
through 1998:4. The “ipolate” command in Stata is again employed to con-
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20. This follows procedures utilized by Ling (1999) and Berndt et al. (1995, 1997).
21. Recommended dosages vary by indication. For example, whereas the recommended
dosage of Zantac for treating active duodenal ulcers, active gastric ulcers, and GERD is 300
mg per day (either 300 mg once daily or 150 mg twice daily), the recommended dosage for duo-
denal ulcer maintenance therapy is only 150 mg per day.
22. For each of the four OTC H2s, the transformation of OTC to Rx involves using twice the
maximum daily recommended OTC dosages.
23. Ling (1999). The seven brands are Tums, Mylanta, Gaviscon, Maalox, Alka-Seltzer, Ro-
laids, and Pepto-Bismol.vert expenditure data from quarterly to monthly. Monthly advertising ex-
penditures in current dollars are then deﬂated by the BLS Producer Price
Index for Advertising Agencies, as discussed above.
8.6 Observed Patterns Near the End of the Patented Product Life Cycle
“Nostalgia isn’t what it used to be.”
—Unknown
We now turn to a description and preliminary analysis of marketing and
pricing developments as the Rx H2 manufacturers anticipated and accom-
modated loss of patent protection of their own products or those of their
competitors. We also examine the impacts of the preemptive launch of OTC
H2 variants and the eﬀects of competition from generic Rx H2 producers.
8.6.1  Marketing Intensity Near Patent Expiration
We begin by examining how branded pioneer ﬁrms changed their mar-
keting behavior in anticipation of, and following, loss of patent protection.
To assess the hypotheses advanced in section 8.3, we examine marketing
eﬀorts for the two H2 antagonists losing patent expiration, Tagamet (May
1994) and Zantac (August 1997).24 We compare average marketing eﬀorts
when the date of patent expiration is quite some time away (between 25 and
48 months ahead), as it becomes much closer (between 1 and 24 months
ahead), and has passed (0 to 23 months after). For each time frame, we
compute average monthly minutes of detailing and average journal pages,
as well as the Dorfman-Steiner dollar ratio of average marketing expendi-
tures to average sales revenues. Diﬀerences between the periods 1–24 and
25–48 months prior to patent expiration are called “near versus far away,”
and those between the periods 0–23 months after and 25–48 months before
are called “after versus far away.” The results of these calculations are given
in table 8.1, the top panel in terms of marketing quantity levels, and the bot-
tom in ratios of dollar marketing to sales.
For Tagamet, average monthly minutes of detailing fell by 30 percent as
its patent expiration approached (May 1992–April 1994 vs. May 1990–
April 1992) and by 87 percent following its patent expiration in May 1994
(May 1994–April 1996 vs. May 1990–April 1992). Journal page advertising
fell even more sharply, by 55 percent and 97 percent, respectively. The ratio
of total marketing (detailing plus medical journal advertising) expenditures
to total sales revenue (bottom two rows of table 8.1) fell by 43 percent as
Tagamet patent expiration approached, and then it subsequently fell by a
smaller amount, 30, after patent expiration. The post-patent smaller decline
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24. For Zantac, patent expiration actually occurred on Friday, 25 July 1997. Since this was
near the end of July and began on a weekend, we approximate the beginning of patent expira-
tion as August 1997.in the ratio reﬂects in part the sharp decrease in the denominator—brand
revenues—after patent expiration.
For Zantac, the decline in marketing eﬀorts was even more dramatic. Av-
erage monthly minutes of detailing fell by 59 percent as Zantac patent ex-
piration approached (August 1995–July 1997 vs. August 1993–July 1995),
and by 94 percent following Zantac patent expiration in August 1997 (Au-
gust 1997–July 1999 vs. August 1995–July 1997). As with Tagamet, journal
page advertising fell even more sharply than detailing minutes, at 99 percent
and 100 percent, respectively. The total marketing-sales ratio fell by almost
60 percent, and it fell by an additional 13 percent after patent expiration.
It is also of interest to examine how the competitors of Zantac, then the
leading selling H2, reacted when they observed Zantac cutting back on mar-
keting in anticipation of and following Zantac’s patent expiration. Because
the entire H2 prescription drug market was in decline during this time due
to competition from the more potent PPIs and the introduction of OTC ver-
sions that potentially cannibalized H2 Rx sales, would Pepcid and Axid Rx
also cut back on marketing eﬀorts? Or would they capitalize on a strategic
opportunity to ﬁll a void created by the dramatic cutbacks by Tagamet and
Zantac, and instead increase their marketing eﬀorts?25 The marketing re-
sponses of Pepcid and Axid surrounding the time of Zantac’s patent expi-
ration are summarized in the last two columns of table 8.1. 
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Table 8.1 Changes in Marketing Efforts in Anticipation of and Following Patent Expiration,
H2-Antagonist Prescription Drugs (%)
Tagamet Zantac Pepcid at Zantac Axid at Zantac
Patent Loss Patent Loss Patent Loss Patent Loss
Minutes of detailing
Near vs. far away –30.2 –59.3 –19.6 –36.0
After vs. far away –86.6 –94.4 –28.3 –48.5
Pages of journal advertising
Near vs. far away –55.1 –99.3 257.7 –16.1
After vs. far away –96.7 –100.0 –16.2 –94.7
Dollar Marketing to Dollar Sales Ratios
Detailing dollars to sales ratio
Near vs. far away –37.8 –57.4 –39.1 –36.3
After vs. far away –32.3 –71.2 –36.7 –35.1
Total detailing plus journal 
advertisingdollars to sales ratio
Near vs. far away –43.1 –59.8 –33.3 –36.0
After vs. far away –30.1 –72.8 –35.3 –35.5
Notes: For Tagamet, “far away” is May 1990–April 1992, “near” is May 1992–April 1994, and “after” is
May 1994–April 1996. For Zantac, Pepcid, and Axid, “far away” is August 1993–July 1995, “near” is Au-
gust 1995–July 1997, and “after” is August 1997–July 1999.
25. Note that the patents of Axid and Pepcid did not expire until 2001.Pepcid and Axid had rather diﬀerent responses. For Axid, average min-
utes of detailing fell by about 36 percent as Zantac’s patent expiration ap-
proached, and they fell another 13 percent following expiration. The jour-
nal advertising cutback was more varied: 16 percent as Zantac’s patent
expiration approached and 95 percent following it. For Pepcid, however, the
decline in minutes of detailing was much more modest—only 20 percent in
the time leading up to Zantac patent expiration, and an additional 8 percent
following it. Journal page advertising for Pepcid actually increased by 258
percent (from rather low levels) as Zantac patent expiration approached,
and after patent expiration it fell to 16 percent less than that 25–48 months
before Zantac patent expiration occurred. Although the responses of Pep-
cid and Axid as Zantac cut back on its levels of marketing eﬀorts diﬀered,
they were quite similar in terms of total marketing-sales ratios. Both re-
duced these ratios by about 33–36 percent as Zantac patent expiration ap-
proached and then maintained them at approximately those values after
Zantac’s patent expiration.
Finally, IMS data indicate zero recorded detailing eﬀorts by generic man-
ufacturers. However, for about twelve to eighteen months following patent
expiration, generic manufacturers of cimetidine and ranitidine did a very
modest amount of medical journal advertising.26 Although the generic
ﬁrms’ medical journal advertisements announced the new availability of
cimetidine or ranitidine, frequently these ads also noted the portfolio of
other generic products oﬀered by the manufacturer rather than focusing on
their speciﬁc H2 products. 
8.6.2  Pricing of Rx Drugs in Anticipation of 
and Following Patent Expiration
Next we analyze pricing behavior prior to and following patent expira-
tion. Figure 8.1 plots prices per day of therapy for Rx Tagamet and generic
Rx cimetidine from January 1989 through December 1998, whereas ﬁgure
8.2 presents those for Rx Zantac and generic Rx ranitidine over the same
period. Both ﬁgures include the average price per day of therapy over all Rx
and OTC forms for each molecule (“Total Molecule”) and the average price
over branded Rx and generic Rx (“Total Rx”). All prices are in current (not
deﬂated) dollars.
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26. For cimetidine, medical journal pages with generic cimetidine advertisements in the
eighteen months following Tagamet patent expiration were only about 14 percent of the cor-
responding Tagamet pages in the eighteen months prior to its patent expiration. For ranitidine,
in the eighteen months prior to Zantac patent expiration, Zantac had no medical journal ad-
vertising, and thus no direct comparison with generic post-patent advertising is available. The
number of pages of generic ranitidine advertising in the eighteen months following Zantac
patent expiration was only about 17 percent of Tagamet’s pages in the eighteen months prior
to Tagamet’s patent expiration. For both generic cimetidine and ranitidine, journal page ad-















































eAs is seen in ﬁgure 8.1, Tagamet’s Rx price continued to increase follow-
ing patent expiration in May 1994, and by December 1998 it was about 5
percent greater than five years earlier when it lost patent protection. The
price of generic cimetidine has fallen considerably since 1994 but has re-
mained fairly constant since about mid-1997. By late 1998, the Tagamet Rx
brand price was almost eight times that of generic Rx cimetidine. Instead of
meeting price competition from the generics, Tagamet Rx maintained and
even slightly increased its price.
Patent expiration provided considerable beneﬁts for cimetidine con-
sumers who switched to generic versions. In particular, the total Rx price of
cimetidine (a sales-weighted average over Tagamet Rx and generic cimeti-
dine Rx) has fallen to about 20 percent of its level at the time of patent ex-
piration in May 1994. The total Rx price at late 1998 was about one-sixth
that of the Tagamet Rx brand price. 
Figure 8.2 presents the comparable price paths for Zantac Rx and generic
Rx ranitidine. Following loss of market exclusivity in July 1997, the Zantac
brand price increased steadily, and by late 1998 it was about 10 percent
higher than at patent expiration. The rate of price decline for generic rani-
tidine immediately following patent expiration appears to be greater than
that of cimetidine (compare ﬁgures 8.1 and 8.2). This diﬀerence could re-
ﬂect greater entry incentives for ranitidine, because at the time of patent ex-
piration the branded Zantac Rx was a larger dollar and unit sales market
than was branded Tagamet Rx. In December 1998 the price of generic rani-
tidine was about one-quarter that of Zantac at the time of its patent expira-
tion and one-fifth of the current Zantac price. Zantac pricing in the post–
patent expiration era does not appear to diﬀer in any dramatic way from the
patent-protected time period, although its prices have increased more
sharply than has Tagamet Rx since patent expiration.
Just as with cimetidine, consumers have realized far lower average prices
for ranitidine following Zantac’s patent expiration. By late 1998 the aver-
age ranitidine Rx price (a sales-weighted average over Zantac Rx and
generic ranitidine Rx) was about 65 percent lower than it was at the time of
Zantac patent expiration in July 1997.
In summary, neither Tagamet Rx nor Zantac Rx adopted a policy of
competing with generics on price following patent expiration, and instead
they increased prices. As a consequence, they lost a very substantial market
share but retained sales to a small, relatively price-insensitive segment of
brand-loyal customers.
8.6.3  Molecule Rx Volume Before and After Patent Expiration
Next we examine quantity (patient days of Rx therapy) data for cimeti-
dine and ranitidine before and after patent expiration. For branded Taga-
met, as is seen in ﬁgure 8.3, sales were relatively ﬂat during the four years
preceding patent expiration in May 1994 but plummeted afterward as























sgeneric entrants ﬂourished. By late 1998, generic cimetidine had more than
95 percent market share of the prescription cimetidine market. Total quan-
tity of brand plus generic Rx cimetidine sales (labeled “Total Rx” in ﬁgure
8.3) has shrunk by about one-third since Tagamet lost patent protection,
even though the average price per day of therapy for the Rx cimetidine mol-
ecule (over its brand and generic Rx versions) declined precipitously (see
ﬁgure 8.1). This cimetidine Rx sales decline reﬂects the combined impacts
of new competition from generic ranitidine following Zantac Rx patent ex-
piration, increased rivalry from the PPIs, cannibalization from the intro-
duction of the OTC variant Tagamet HB, and sharply curtailed Rx market-
ing eﬀorts. 
For Rx ranitidine the picture is slightly diﬀerent, as is seen in ﬁgure 8.4.
In particular, branded Zantac Rx sales appear to have fallen steadily since
early 1995 (around the time Pepcid AC, the ﬁrst OTC H2, came on the mar-
ket), preceding its patent expiration by more than two years. Reﬂecting per-
haps the eﬀects of OTC cannibalization, branded Zantac Rx sales contin-
ued a steady decline until August 1997, when Rx patent expiration took
place. Thereafter, as with branded Tagamet Rx, branded Zantac Rx quan-
tity units fell dramatically, and by December 1998 Zantac Rx unit sales were
about 10 percent of their 1994–95 peak levels. Total ranitidine Rx sales
(“Total Rx” in figure 8.4) also experienced a continued decline following
patent expiration. The post–patent expiration decline in total Rx sales for
ranitidine is smaller than that for cimetidine (compare ﬁgures 8.3 and 8.4),
but the fall in average Rx price for ranitidine from the time of patent ex-
piration is also smaller for ranitidine Rx than with cimetidine Rx (compare
ﬁgures 8.1 and 8.2).
8.6.4  L(a)unching with Cannibals: Eﬀects of OTCs on Rx Sales 
Next we turn to an exploratory empirical assessment of the impact of a
brand’s OTC introduction on its own Rx sales. In theory, this impact could
be either positive or negative. If cannibalization is extensive, then patients
taking Rx versions will switch to the OTC product, and the trend of overall
OTC plus Rx sales for that brand will be largely unaﬀected. Alternatively,
nonusers exposed to marketing for OTC products might seek advice from
their physicians and be prescribed the stronger Rx version (whether as med-
ically appropriate or as a consequence of insurance coverage), generating
positive spillovers. If these spillovers are suﬃciently large, overall OTC plus
Rx sales for that brand could increase. Whether cannibalization or positive
spillovers dominate is therefore an empirical issue. 
We expect that because it was the largest-selling Rx product, Zantac
faced the greatest threat of cannibalization of its Rx product by an OTC
version. In contrast, with patent expiration already behind it, Tagamet had
the most to gain from its OTC launch. We now assess the net eﬀects on
brand sales of OTC introductions by brand.























sFirst, we compare Rx and OTC prices. Recall that for comparability, the
OTC price per day of therapy assumes twice the recommended daily OTC
dosage, so that the Rx and OTC versions have the same amount of mg
strength each day. By December 1998 the OTC Tagamet HB price per day
of therapy is about 45 percent the Rx Tagamet price, but slightly more than
three times the Rx generic cimetidine price, as shown in figure 8.1. Fig-
ure 8.2 shows that by late 1998, on a per-patient day of therapy basis, the
price of OTC Zantac 75 is about one and one-half times that of Rx generic
ranitidine, but only about 40 percent that of Zantac Rx. These estimates of
the diﬀerence between the branded Rx and OTC versions are a lower bound
of the true diﬀerential magnitude, since the Rx generic price does not in-
clude the retail margin, which is often larger than that for the branded Rx
product, whereas the OTC price is gross of the retail margin. In spite of this
OTC relative price overstatement, for consumers paying cash, purchasing
a day of therapy is much less expensive with the OTC versions of Tagamet
and Zantac than with their branded Rx variants. The OTC purchase also
avoids the time and other costs of obtaining a physician’s prescription.
Although to save on space we do not present comparable ﬁgures here for
Pepcid and Axid, prices per day of therapy for Pepcid Rx and Axid Rx were
about two and one-half times their comparable OTC price in late 1998. 
The quantity of OTC Tagamet sold in late 1998 is about seven to eight
times larger than Rx Tagamet. In 1995 OTC sales resuscitated overall brand
sales following the 1994 loss of Tagamet patent protection. Tagamet’s OTC
introduction was a clear spillover winner: Because its brand Rx sales had
fallen so sharply following patent expiration, there were few Rx sales left to
cannibalize. By mid-1998, however, total Rx plus OTC Tagamet sales were
again falling, and by late 1998 they reached levels about the same as just
prior to patent expiration. Through its OTC launch, Tagamet averted and
postponed the gradual brand franchise death, but only temporarily. 
For Zantac, as seen in ﬁgure 8.4, the introduction of an OTC version in
May 1996 appears to have revived the Zantac brand franchise, temporarily
raising total Zantac Rx plus Zantac 75 OTC patient day sales. By fall 1997,
immediately following Zantac Rx patent expiration, total Zantac unit sales
were about the same as those in early 1996, just prior to the launch of Zan-
tac 75. Zantac OTC unit sales have continued a slow but steady increase in
recent years even as Zantac Rx sales have declined sharply, and by late 1998
patient days of Zantac OTC were twice those of Zantac Rx. Although (un-
like Tagamet) in some ways the Zantac franchise beneﬁted from an OTC in-
troduction prior to its Rx patent expiration, it also appears that the Zantac
franchise suﬀered cannibalization of Zantac Rx by Zantac 75. As the best-
selling Rx therapy, Zantac was most susceptible to the various OTC intro-
ductions, including its own. 
Tagamet OTC revenues (not shown) were about three times greater
than those for Tagamet Rx in late 1998, whereas OTC Zantac 75 revenues
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OTC and Rx versions, however, Zantac revenues were about four to five
times larger than those for Tagamet. Hence, although on a relative basis
the OTC introductions appear to have beneﬁted Tagamet more than Zan-
tac, on an absolute revenue basis over both OTC and Rx forms, Zantac
gained more.
8.7 Price Index Construction with Generic and 
Over-the-Counter “New Good” Entry
Constructing price and quantity measures on the basis of simple
summed-up milligram units for a given molecule implicitly assumes that,
for example, generic versions of cimetidine are perfectly substitutable with
Tagamet (branded cimetidine). Similarly, aggregating milligrams of the
OTC version of Zantac to milligrams of the Zantac Rx and generic Rx ran-
itidine, then obtaining price per milligram by dividing total revenue by
these summed milligrams, also assumes perfect substitutability among
OTC and Rx versions of ranitidine. Because perfect substitutability is
clearly an unrealistic assumption (witness, for example, continued sales of
Rx Zantac after much lower priced generic Rx ranitidine enters), it is use-
ful to examine alternative methods for creating aggregate price indexes that
allow for imperfect substitutability.
Recall from our earlier discussion in section 8.4 that in the context of
medical care, we believe the traditional theory of consumer demand is best
employed with great caution. In particular, principal-agent issues involving
relationships between patients and their physicians, and the role of moral
hazard and insurance in creating wedges between insurers’ and consumers’
marginal prices for covered Rx drugs, seriously compromise and constrain
one’s ability to draw any consumer welfare implications from observed ag-
gregate price index trends.
We have implemented the methodologies of Feenstra and GC, as out-
lined in section 8.4. Speciﬁcally, to implement the Feenstra procedure using
nonlinear estimation procedures, we have estimated parameters in the nor-
malized quantity equation (6) derived from the CES brand-generic demand
equations, using monthly data from both before and after patent expiration
for Tagamet and Zantac; an analogous equation system based on the trans-
log unit expenditure function was also estimated. In each case, the two-
equation system (cimetidine and ranitidine) is estimated by maximum like-
lihood, allowing for contemporaneous correlation among residuals in the
two equations. 
To implement the GC methodology, single equation least squares proce-
dures are employed in estimating the CES parameters in equation (5), using
only post–patent expiration data for the cimetidine and ranitidine equa-
tions. 
254 Ernst R. Berndt, Margaret K. Kyle, and Davina C. LingFor both the Feenstra and GC procedures, aggregate CES price indexes
for the cimetidine and ranitidine molecules are then constructed by insert-
ing parameter estimates into equation (4). In the GC method, the assumed
reservation price just prior to the time of initial generic entry is midway be-
tween the brand and generic price. Aggregate molecule price indexes incor-
porating the introduction of OTCs as new goods are calculated in an anal-
ogous manner. Notice that in the GC method these aggregate price indexes
depend only on brand-generic substitutability within each molecule, and
not on own-price elasticities for the molecule in aggregate.
Before proceeding with a discussion of results comparing the GC and
Feenstra procedures, we emphasize that with both the GC and Feenstra
procedures, our simplest demand speciﬁcation is quite restrictive in that no
account is taken of other, nonprice factors aﬀecting demands, such as mar-
keting eﬀorts. In the GC speciﬁcation that only employs post–patent expi-
ration data, this restrictiveness may not be that undesirable, because only
brand-generic substitutability within a given molecule is being modeled,
and, as we observed earlier, in practice very few marketing eﬀorts occur af-
ter patent expiration. On the other hand, in the Feenstra speciﬁcation, be-
cause pre–patent expiration data are included, excluding nonprice factors
as regressors in the total molecule demand equation (3), such as measures
of relative brand marketing eﬀorts, could well be expected to have a much
larger impact. Moreover, although brand marketing variables could be in-
troduced as additional regressors, since patent expiration could involve a
regime shift, we would not be surprised if parameters on these price and
marketing variables would diﬀer in the pre– and post–patent expiration en-
vironments. It is possible that regime shifts are less evident in the Rx-to-
OTC context than in the patent expiration and brand-generic entry envi-
ronment.
8.7.1  Cimetidine and Ranitidine Price Indexes with Generic Entry
Despite a substantial amount of experimentation with alternative time
periods, functional forms, and the incorporation of measures of marketing
eﬀorts, we were unable to obtain satisfactory estimates of the crucial within-
molecule substitution elasticity estimates using the Feenstra procedure. 
More speciﬁcally, with marketing eﬀort measures excluded, and using
data from the January 1989–June 1999 time frame, for both the CES and
translog speciﬁcations we obtained reasonable estimates for the cimetidine
and ranitidine aggregate molecule own-price elasticities of demand; these
ranged from around –2.2 to –2.4 for the CES form for cimetidine and rani-
tidine, respectively, whereas the corresponding estimates based on the trans-
log were about –2.6 and –2.3. However, estimates of the within-molecule
brand-generic substitution elasticity were either of the wrong sign or of an
unreasonable magnitude. For example, for cimetidine and ranitidine, based
on the CES form, the estimates of   were about –1.6 and 140, respectively;
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based substitution elasticity estimates were about –0.6 and 70. 
To check on the robustness of these unsatisfactory   estimates, we sys-
tematically shortened the pre–patent expiration time period that ended ﬁrst
in May 1994 for Tagamet, sequentially dropping all observations in 1990,
1990–91, 1990–92, and then 1990–93; although estimates of both the own-
price and cross-brand–generic substitution elasticity varied considerably
with the choice of time period, in no case did satisfactory  estimates result.
We also experimented with a number of speciﬁcations that incorporated
measures of marketing eﬀorts; for each molecule, we cumulated physician-
oriented detailing data over the previous twelve months and included in
each of the molecule equations both own and others’ cumulative marketing
eﬀorts. Although estimates of parameters on own-molecule cumulative
marketing eﬀorts were typically positive and signiﬁcant, estimates on oth-
ers’ cumulative marketing eﬀorts were negative and only occasionally sig-
niﬁcant. More importantly, however, inclusion of these additional Rx mar-
keting eﬀort measures did not entirely overcome our inability to obtain
satisfactory estimates of the  within-molecule elasticity of substitution be-
tween brand and generic. Unlike the situation with marketing eﬀorts ex-
cluded, when marketing eﬀort measures were included the molecule whose
elasticity of substitution estimate was typically of the wrong sign was rani-
tidine (estimates ranged from –6.1 to –4,443), whereas elasticity of substi-
tution estimates for cimitedine ranged from 1.02 (using January 1991–
December 1998 data) to 3.26 (January 1994–December 1998).
If one instead implements the GC method using only post–patent expi-
ration observations, own-price elasticity estimates for the aggregate mole-
cule are not needed, and estimates of the brand-generic elasticities of sub-
stitution for the CES turn out to be plausible at 1.44 (standard error of 0.11)
and 1.96 (0.18). For the translog, assuming generic revenue shares of 0.67,
the GC parameter estimates imply elasticity of substitution estimates of
1.42 and 1.99 for cimetidine and ranitidine, respectively. Since only a very
modest amount of medical journal advertising was conducted by generic
entrants after patent expiration, and since generic physician detailing
eﬀorts were essentially zero, it is not surprising that incorporating brand-
generic relative marketing eﬀorts into the revenue share equations as an ad-
ditional regressor did not change these results in any material manner. 
8.7.2  Price Indexes for All Four Molecules Accounting 
for Over-the-Counter Entry
OTC entry occurred for Tagamet HB in August 1995, about ﬁfteen
months after Rx Tagamet lost patent expiration. In contrast, the OTC en-
try of Zantac 75 took place in April 1996, about eighteen months before the
August 1997 loss of patent expiration for Rx Zantac. The Tagamet-Zantac
OTC launch date experience is very diﬀerent from that of both Pepcid AC
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years before their patent expiration occurred (in 2001). We now examine ag-
gregate price indexes for each of the four molecules, where the aggregate is
over Rx brand, Rx generic (only in the case of cimetidine and ranitidine),
and OTC brand versions. 
We begin by constructing, for cimetidine and ranitidine, a price index
over brand and generic Rx versions. Since, as discussed in the preceding
subsection, our modeling eﬀorts to construct price indexes over brand and
generic versions were generally unable to yield satisfactory brand-generic
substitution elasticity estimates, we use the nonparametric Divisia index
procedure instead. 
With the Feenstra method, we then model total generalized quantity for
each molecule (Rx and OTC) using both pre– and post–OTC launch data,
whereas with the GC method we employ only the post–OTC launch data.
Measures of total marketing for each molecule include that for Rx market-
ing for each molecule (the sum of constant dollar expenditures for physi-
cian-oriented detailing, physician-oriented journal advertising, and DTC
of the Rx brand), plus the OTC measure of Rx marketing for each molecule
(only DTC marketing of the OTC brand). We then cumulated total mar-
keting eﬀorts for each molecule over the preceding twelve months. We also
constructed a relative Rx-OTC marketing measure as the ratio of the Rx cu-
mulative marketing eﬀorts to OTC cumulative marketing eﬀorts, where the
cumulation encompasses the preceding twelve months. Because the DTC
data available to us ended in December 1998, we utilize data over the ten-
year time period January 1989–December 1998, yielding cumulative mar-
keting eﬀort measures for each molecule for the nine-year period January
1990–December 1998.
The Feenstra method involves maximum likelihood estimation of a four-
equation system with cross-equation parameter restrictions and a balanced
panel, whereas for the GC method single equation ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation is carried out using each molecule’s post–OTC launch
data only. In both the Feenstra and GC methods, for price index construc-
tion the crucial parameter is the Rx versus OTC substitution elasticity,
which of course diﬀers for each of the four molecules.
Using the Feenstra procedure and excluding marketing variables, we ex-
perienced considerable numerical convergence issues, with typically two or
so of the within-molecule Rx-OTC elasticity estimates being very large in
absolute value (sometimes positive, sometimes negative). Matters improved
considerably, however, when we incorporated into each of the CES general-
ized quantity equations both that molecule’s own total marketing eﬀorts
and the total marketing eﬀorts summed over the other three molecules,
where both marketing measures are logarithmically transformed. Speciﬁ-
cally, estimates of the within-molecule Rx-OTC elasticity of substitution
were 2.00 (standard error of 0.20) for famotidine (Pepcid), 1.42 (0.10) for
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(Tagamet), however, the point estimate was an unreasonably large 9,069,
with a standard error almost 100 times as large. Interestingly, for each of the
four molecules the own (log) total marketing elasticity estimate was positive
and signiﬁcant (ranging from a low of 0.057 for famotidine to a high of
0.136 for ranitidine, with respective standard errors of 0.027 and 0.023),
whereas those for the (log) of the sum of the other molecules’ marketing
eﬀorts was negative, albeit only in the case of nizaditine was the –0.391 es-
timate signiﬁcant (standard error of 0.106). Except for cimetidine, estimates
of the own-price total molecule demand price elasticity were negative, sig-
niﬁcant, and plausible, whereas that for cimetidine was very imprecisely es-
timated.
Given the very large standard error estimates on the cimetidine own-
price and within-molecule Rx-OTC elasticity of substitution estimates, we
constrained the   elasticity of substitution estimate for cimetidine to be
1.74, the mean of the corresponding   estimates over famotidine, raniti-
dine, and nizaditine. We then substituted these  estimates into equation (4)
and computed exact price indexes for each of the four molecules, where
these price indexes are an aggregate over Rx and OTC versions. These mol-
ecule-speciﬁc four aggregate price indexes are graphed in ﬁgure 8.5, where
for each molecule the price index is 1.000 in January 1989. A number of
points are worth noting.
First, for all four molecules, prices generally increase during the ﬁrst ﬁve
years from January 1989 to January 1994, and in the second half of the
sample they take on diﬀerent time paths. 
The cimetidine price falls in early 1994 following patent expiration and
generic entry and experiences another sharp fall in mid-1995 as OTC entry
occurs. At the end of 1998, the cimetidine price index had fallen to a level
of 0.548, about 42 percent of its April 1994 peak of 1.312.
For famotidine, the fall in price is also substantial, but because it had not
lost patent protection by end 1998, its price decline reﬂects only the impact
of OTC entry. As seen in ﬁgure 8.5, there is a sharp decline in the famotidine
price in mid-1995 as Pepcid AC enters, and thereafter prices are roughly
stable, ending at 0.793 in December 1998, about 29 percent less than its
1.112 value in May 1995 just prior to the OTC launch of Pepcid AC.
In contrast to both cimetidine and famotidine, for nizaditine the mole-
cule price increases steadily from January 1989 through June 1996; it then
drops about 15 percent to 1.04–1.06 in late 1996, and thereafter it experi-
ences a steady increase, ending up at 1.147 in December 1998, down about
11 percent from the 1.289 level in June 1996 just prior to launch of the OTC
Axid AR product. The Rx version of Axid did not lose patent protection
until 2001, beyond the December 1998 last observation in this study.
For ranitidine, however, the combination of lost patent protection, very
substantial low-priced generic entry, and substantial growth of the OTC







































sZantac 75 product resulted in by far the largest price decline among the four
molecules. As seen in ﬁgure 8.5, the ranitidine molecule experienced about
a 25 percent price decline in May 1996 as OTC entry of Zantac 75 occurred,
then another sharp price decline of about 25 percent between August and
December 1997 as generic ranitidine initially entered the market, and con-
tinuing declines during 1998 with further generic ranitidine entry. In De-
cember 1998, the ranitidine molecule price index was 0.313, about 30 per-
cent of its level just prior to the OTC launch of Zantac 75 and about 50
percent of its level just prior to entry of generic ranitidine.
These molecule price indexes are based on the Feenstra methodology
that includes observations for each molecule both before and after OTC en-
try. Following GC, we have also estimated the Rx-OTC elasticity of substi-
tution using equation (8) and, for each molecule, only the data following
OTC launch. These results were somewhat disappointing. For all four mol-
ecules, GC-CES estimates of  were less than 1.0, violating a necessary con-
dition of the model that   > 1. With relative Rx/OTC marketing variables
excluded, the estimated   (standard error follows in parentheses) was 0.802
(0.215) for cimetidine, 0.892 (0.164) for famotidine, –0.400 (0.581) for ran-
itidine, and –0.399 (0.186) for nizatidine. When a cumulative (log) relative
Rx/OTC marketing variable was included as an additional regressor in
equation (8), the relative marketing variable was typically signiﬁcant and of
the right sign, but all of the   estimates remained below unity. These   esti-
mates were 0.848 (0.210) for cimetidine, 0.535 (0.134) for famotidine, –
0.105 (0.312) for ranitidine, and –0.222 (0.273) for nizatidine. Since mea-
sures of consumer surplus are inﬁnite when   1.0, conditions for the va-
lidity of the CES exact price index are violated, and thus we do not report
the corresponding price indexes.
8.8 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have reported results of our research examining the
“sunset” H2s up to and following their Rx patent expiration, as they en-
countered cannibalization from their own and competitors’ OTC introduc-
tions, and as they faced forces of creative destruction from the next genera-
tion of more potent antiulcer and heartburn Rx drugs, the PPIs. Although
the looming prospect of patent expiration had signiﬁcant impacts on the be-
havior of the H2 manufacturers in terms of their pricing and marketing be-
havior, it was more than the shadow of patent expiration that dimmed the
H2prospects—undoubtedly, the forces of dynamic competition in the form
of the newly dominant PPI products were equally foreboding.
Within this larger context, consumers appear to have beneﬁted from
generic entry and the introduction of OTC versions of previously prescrip-
tion-only H2s. One way to characterize these developments is to employ the
exact aggregate price and quantity measures based on the CES function
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each molecule) and then construct aggregate Divisia price and quantity in-
dexes encompassing all four molecules. These aggregate H2price and quan-
tity measures, denoted PH2TOT and QH2TOT, are graphed in ﬁgure 8.6,
with each indexed to 1.000 in January 1989. As is seen in ﬁgure 8.6, the ag-
gregate H2 price series increased steadily from January 1989 to about Janu-
ary 1992, was ﬂat at about 1.15 for several years until early 1995, and then
began to fall, with a particularly large decline in early 1996 (following OTC
entry by several brands) and another substantial decline in late 1997 fol-
lowing Zantac loss of patent protection and Rx generic ranitidine entry. By
the end of our sample in December 1998, the aggregate H2 price index was
0.57, roughly 50 percent lower than in early 1995 just prior to the ﬁrst OTC
entry.
In terms of quantity of H2s consumed, from January 1989 to early 1995
the quantity index increased from 1.00 to about 1.33, then grew more rap-
idly to about 1.86 by November 1996, and then began falling again, ending
up at about 1.41 in December 1998. 
It is worth emphasizing again, however, that how one interprets these
price and quantity trends is somewhat ambiguous, given principal-agent re-
lationships between physicians and patients, and the moral hazard arising
from insurance coverage of Rx, but typically not OTC, versions of these
products. 
As expected, we ﬁnd that the branded H2 manufacturers have not com-
peted on price with generic entrants following Rx patent expiration but in-
stead have maintained or even slightly increased brand prices, losing mar-
ket share and retaining sales to a small but relatively price-insensitive
segment of brand-loyal customers. 
We also ﬁnd evidence strongly supporting the notion of protracted eﬀects
from marketing. In particular, we ﬁnd very substantial declines in market-
ing eﬀorts by branded ﬁrms as Rx patent expiration approaches, a phe-
nomenon suggesting long-rather than short-lived anticipated sales impacts
from marketing.
Even though generic entry results in average molecule prices (weighted
over brand and generic) falling 65–80 percent of their pre–patent expiration
levels, for both cimetidine and ranitidine the combined brand and generic
quantity sales following patent expiration have also fallen considerably.
This utilization decline could reﬂect the impacts of decreased marketing
eﬀorts, competition from the more potent PPIs, or cannibalization of Rx
sales by the introduction and marketing of a same-brand OTC product. The
relative importance of these various factors in explaining the post–patent
expiration decline in sales is a topic worthy of further research.
On a per-patient-day basis, we ﬁnd that in late 1998 brand OTC prices
were 35–45 percent of their brand Rx prices, but brand OTC prices were
still several times larger than same molecule generic Rx prices. These price













































sratios should be interpreted somewhat cautiously, however, since the Rx
prices do not reﬂect retail margins, unlike the OTC prices based on scanner
transaction data.
Since Zantac executed the OTC switch prior to its 1997 patent expiration,
it suﬀered considerably from OTC cannibalization of Rx sales, but ulti-
mately the substantial amount of OTC Zantac 75 sales has partially resus-
citated the Zantac brand franchise. Because Tagamet lost patent protection
prior to its OTC switch, it had the least to lose by going OTC, and in fact on
a relative basis its OTC-Rx sales ratio has grown, although levels of both
OTC Tagamet HB and Tagamet Rx are small.
Finally, we have compared two diﬀerent approaches to incorporating the
generic and OTC new goods into aggregate price indexes. The GC method
yielded reasonably plausible elasticity of substitution estimates in the con-
text of Rx generics’ being the new good relative to Rx brands. However, in
this brand-generic context, the Feenstra method did not fare as well, yield-
ing estimates of the within-molecule elasticity of substitution that were ei-
ther of the wrong sign or of an unreasonable magnitude. Matters did not
improve much for the Feenstra method when demand equations were aug-
mented by own and others’ measures of cumulative marketing eﬀorts. We
note that in Feenstra (1997), the Feenstra method yielded plausible substi-
tution elasticity estimates for cephalexin, but not for cephradine.
The Feenstra and GC methods reversed roles when the new good was in-
stead deﬁned to be an OTC version of the branded Rx drug. With the GC
method, estimates of the elasticity of substitution were all less than unity,
violating an integrability condition that requires  > 1. In contrast, with the
Feenstra method, in the Rx-to-OTC context three of the four estimates of
  were plausible and reasonably precisely estimated, whereas only one had
an implausibly large value (and standard error). The addition of marketing
variables to the molecule demand equation was particularly important in
the Feenstra methodology, for there it greatly facilitated numerical conver-
gence to plausible parameter estimates. Although detailed results were not
presented in the paper, it is worth noting that the relative performance of the
GC and Feenstra methods was unchanged when the CES functional form
was replaced by a translog expenditure function.
Together, these results suggest that use of econometric methods in con-
structing price indexes that incorporate the eﬀects of new goods requires
considerably more experimentation, perhaps with other data sets and fam-
ilies of products, and with speciﬁcations that include nonprice factors
aﬀecting demand functions, such as measures of marketing eﬀorts. Future
research should focus on the conditions under which the Feenstra, the GC,
or some other method is more likely to yield robust and plausible ﬁndings.
Particular attention needs to be focused on the feasibility of integrating
scanner price, quantity, and promotional data with more complete mea-
sures of marketing eﬀorts from other publicly available data sources. Until
The Long Shadow of Patent Expiration 263more progress is made on these fronts, and reasonably robust ﬁndings are
reported by a number of independent researchers, government statisticians
may be understandably cautious in publishing price indexes based on
econometrically estimated reservation prices or on econometric estimation
of expenditure formulations that obviate the need for estimation of reser-
vation prices. Apparently, the new goods problem is not simply solved by
mechanical implementation of econometric estimation methods. 
In terms of other future research, the impact of Rx-to-OTC switches on
prices paid by consumers, after allowing for insurance coverage and patient
copays, is a most interesting research topic, as is the more general issue of
the eﬀects of such switches on patient health and consumer welfare. The
availability of scanner data helps make such research feasible. It would also
be useful to exploit econometric procedures that allow for preference esti-
mation even when the number of available products changes over time (see,
e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Bresnahan, Stern, and Trajtenberg
1997). The existence of principal-agent and moral hazard issues, particu-
larly important in the Rx market, however, makes such research very chal-
lenging.
Pepcid, Prozac, and Mevacor all lost patent protection and faced generic
entry in 2001, and Prilosec could face generic entry in 2002, pending the
outcome of patent litigation. Whether the long shadows of imminent patent
protection for these drugs will display similar pricing, marketing, and Rx-
OTC switching patterns to what we have observed in the H2market remains
to be seen.
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Comment Steve Morgan
In “The Long Shadow of Patent Expiration: Generic Entry and Rx-to-OTC
Switches” Ernst R. Berndt, Margaret K. Kyle, and Davina C. Ling tackle
two problems: one concerning producer theory, the other concerning price
measurement based on consumer theory. In both regards, their focus is on
the strategies used by manufactures of “sunset” branded pharmaceutical
products—products for which patent expiry is imminent. They aptly illus-
trate how manufacturers can tailor marketing, pricing, and product lines to
protect the proﬁtability of their brands at this stage of the product life. Un-
derstanding the strategies of sunset brands is important because many lead-
ing pharmaceutical products are due to lose their patented status soon.
It is also of policy interest to assess the welfare impact of market dynam-
ics associated with patent loss. This leads to the second problem addressed
by Berndt, Kyle, and Ling: price measurement in the changing market en-
vironments of sunset branded drug products. In view of the theme of the
conference, my comments focus on these measurement issues; they draw,
however, on the practical realities of the pharmaceutical sector that make
proﬁtable the corporate strategies identiﬁed in the ﬁrst half of their paper. 
Berndt, Kyle, and Ling contrast two approaches to measuring the “new
goods” eﬀects of generic entry and the launch of over-the-counter versions
of brand name products among a class of acid suppression drugs, hista-
mine2-receptor antagonists. They implement a reservation price estimation
technique advocated by Griliches and Cockburn (1994, 1996) and a de-
mand system estimation technique advocated by Feenstra (1997). Both
methods have been use to address the generic drug problem elsewhere, but
not the over-the-counter question.
The method advocated by Griliches and Cockburn is to use postentry
market observations to estimate a reservation price for a generic entrant.
Griliches and Cockburn simplify the task by assuming that consumers have
a uniform distribution of reservation prices over the interval between the
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Berndt, Kyle, and Ling implement the approach using least squares proce-
dures for estimating intraproduct class elasticity of substitution, upon
which reservation price estimates are based.
The results gleaned from the Griliches and Cockburn method are intu-
itive for the prescription-only submarket. Indexes accounting for the price
eﬀect of generics fall upon their entry. Consumers, it would appear, are
better oﬀ from increased competition among chemically equivalent pre-
scription-only products. The econometric results pertaining to the over-
the-counter availability of like-branded histamine2-receptor antagonists,
however, fail to meet necessary assumptions concerning the own-price elas-
ticity when the Griliches and Cockburn method is employed. Postentry
data generate unduly low elasticities.
The index method advocated by Feenstra is based on the estimation of
the elasticity of substitution within and across products using both pre- and
postentry data. It does not require the estimation of a reservation price and
has been applied by Feenstra in other consumer product submarkets as well
as on two classes of prescription drug products (Feenstra 1994). Others
have advocated such a method as a generalized means of addressing substi-
tution biases in product classes where the number of goods ﬂuctuates over
time (Balk 1999).
When Berndt, Kyle, and Ling implement this approach in the absence of
marketing data, the parameter estimates are unstable and the implied in-
dexes are counter-intuitive. As presented at the conference, their ﬁndings
indicated that those price indexes went up after generic entry, implying that
consumers are made worse oﬀ. Indexes that incorporate the impact of over-
the-counter availability of like-branded products also produced inconsis-
tent results in the absence of advertising data. When data on the marketing
eﬀorts are incorporated into the analysis, however, Feenstra-method ﬁnd-
ings related to the over-the-counter availability of like-molecule products
were much improved. Three of four elasticity estimates converged at ex-
pected signs, and the implied price indexes showed substantial declines fol-
lowing the launch of over-the-counter versions of same-brand products.
Interpreting the index results—based on either Griliches and Cockburn’s
methods or Feenstra’s method—that pertain to launch of over-the-counter
products is particularly challenging due to a number of limitations in the
data and the nature of the product class being analyzed.
The wholesale-level prescription data and the retail-level nonprescrip-
tion data are not particularly comparable. This is because wholesale prices
do not closely resemble the actual prices paid by large buyers of pharma-
ceuticals in the United States. Few but the uninsured pay list (wholesale
plus markup) prices for pharmaceuticals. Instead, price-volume discounts
and rebates are typically negotiated between manufacturers and pharmacy
beneﬁt providers (insurers, government agencies, or managed care corpo-
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1990s—suﬃcient to provoke the Health Care Financing Administration to
revise its expenditure estimates to account for average discounts of approx-
imately 24 percent (Genuardi and Stiller 1996). Moreover, discounts are
achieved by pitting competing manufacturers’ price oﬀers against each
other, which sets oﬀa bidding war—the winner of which gets on, or receives
preferential treatment within, the drug beneﬁt provider’s formulary. How-
ever important these pricing dynamics may be, they remain hidden.
Further challenges to the comparability of over-the-counter and pre-
scription-only market segments come from the nature of the products being
sold—including the nature of the information about those products con-
tained in advertising. The prescription-only and over-the-counter products
are marketed for quite diﬀerent indications, even though they are com-
prised of the same active chemical ingredients.1 As Berndt, Kyle, and Ling
acknowledge, over-the-counter histamine2-receptor antagonists are mar-
keted and labeled for the prevention of minor heartburn, acid indigestion,
and sour stomach. The packages of both Zantac 75 and Tagamet HB ex-
plain the dosing regimen for treating or avoiding heartburn due to acid in-
digestion or sour stomach, and warn patient not to use the drug for more
than fourteen days unless directed to by a physician. Manufacturers cannot
legally suggest that these nonprescription products be used for other pur-
poses—neither in their packaging, nor in their advertising. However, to
treat an ulcer with these over-the-counter drugs, patients must take twice
the recommended dose for thirty to sixty days—two to four times the rec-
ommended duration of over-the-counter therapy. There is little doubt that
some consumers do treat ulcers with the over-the-counter products—many,
I suspect, do so on the advice of their physician. A vast majority of con-
sumers in the over-the-counter market, however, are probably taking the
drugs in small doses to ward oﬀ the annoyance of heartburn (e.g., as in-
duced by eating spicy foods), not for the treatment of active ulcers. In light
of these comparability issues, the index results concerning over-the-counter
product launches are probably insuﬃcient grounds to endorse one method-
ology over the other. With either the Feenstra or the Griliches and Cock-
burn method, it is unclear that one is comparing apples with apples.
On the other hand, the anomalous results found with Feenstra’s pre-
ferred method of accounting for the impact of generic availability do pro-
voke questions that may lead one to prefer the method of reservation-price
estimation. In their presentation at the conference, Berndt, Kyle, and Ling
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1. It is not uncommon for a single chemical to be marked for diﬀerent indications. Two ex-
amples illustrate. Glaxo Wellcome markets bupropion hydrochloride as “Wellbutrin” for the
treatment of depression and attention deﬁcit disorder and as “Zyban” to help patients quit
smoking. Merck markets ﬁnasterideas “Propecia” for male pattern baldness and as “Proscar”
for the treatment of benign prostatic hyperplasia (non-cancerous enlargement of the prostate
gland).oﬀer several possible reasons for the prescription-only price index discrep-
ancies. One of these conjectured sources of inconsistency deserves elabora-
tion, because it seems to point toward much-needed future research.
Feenstra’s method requires the stability of parameters within the unit ex-
penditure functions deﬁned over equivalent brand and generic products (or
over prescription and over-the-counter products) as well as the separability
of these unit expenditure functions from the remainder of the consumer’s
utility function. Berndt, Kyle, and Ling remind us that their data span a pe-
riod of more than ten years, raising a caution against the assumption of pa-
rameter stability (and possibly even separablility). In fact, the particular ten
years for the particular products being analyzed may be less stable than
might be the case in other commodity markets, including other classes of
pharmaceuticals.
The nature of the demand for Histamine2-receptor antagonists has been
nothing if not unstable over the past two decades. These antiulcer drugs
were the deﬁning blockbuster drugs of the 1980s—their marketing hype
and cash-box success earning them the Hollywood analogy. Soon after the
stellar rise of this product class, the premise upon which much of its success
was based came under scrutiny. Beginning in the early 1980s, clinical scien-
tists began a protracted debate about the ulcer-causing role of bacteria
known as Helicobacter-pylori. By 1994, evidence indicating that the pres-
ence of the bacteria was a causal factor in gastritis, duodenal ulcer, and
some gastric ulcers had convinced even those who were outspoken critics of
the Helicobacter-pylori theory (Therapeutics Initiative 1994). Combined
with imminent patent expiration and serious prescription-only competition
from the proton pump inhibitors, the widespread acceptance of the Heli-
cobacter-pylori theory forced manufactures of Histamine2-receptor antag-
onists to deﬁne and expand other uses of these acid suppressors.
One would hope that consumers’ (or more speciﬁcally, physicians’) ap-
praisals of the prescription versions of Histamine2-receptor antagonists
changed over the 1990s. If so, the unit expenditure functions for antiulcer
products would neither be stable nor separable from the remainder of con-
sumers’ utility functions. Consider, for example, the interaction between
the marginal utility of Histamine2-receptor antagonists and the antibiotic
products used to eradicate the Helicobacter-pylori bacteria.
Notwithstanding changes unique to the antiulcer market, the availability
of a generic alternative in a subclass can have several impacts on that class
and others. The fact that branded products can “cream-skim” by raising
prices following generic entry implies that the market is somehow seg-
mented. It is quite possible that the most important segmentation is not
with respect to tastes for branded versus generic products, but segmenta-
tion along ﬁnancial incentives. Not only is there a distinction between the
insured and uninsured, but many insured consumers now face forms of in-
centive pricing aimed at encouraging them to consider low-cost generics.
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to understanding what is revealed by their consumption patterns.
Consider patients covered under the British Columbia Pharmacare Plan
A. Plan A, which accounts for about 30 percent of drug spending in this
Canadian province, is a tax-ﬁnanced plan oﬀering drug beneﬁts for all res-
idents in British Columbia who are sixty-ﬁve years of age and older. The
plan covers ingredient costs of prescribed drugs; beneﬁciaries must pay as-
sociated pharmacists’ dispensing fees. Before 1994, Plan A beneﬁciaries
could obtain equivalent branded and generic drugs at the same cost: what-
ever the pharmacist charged for dispensing. Generic utilization under these
incentives was understandably low (Grootendorst et al. 1996). Starting in
April 1994, the government began an incentive pricing policy wherein the
brand-name product was fully covered only for consumers who had med-
ical reasons for obtaining the brand over generic alternatives. All other con-
sumers who preferred the brand to the generic would have to pay the price
diﬀerence—Pharmacare paying a share equal to the cost of the generic.
Figure 8C.1 illustrates how this simple change in ﬁnancial incentives al-
tered utilization patterns. The ﬁgure plots the average market share held by
all (272) brand-name products that existed in 1988 and were subject to
generic competition before 1998, grouped by the year of generic entry. The
average price of brand-name drugs exceeded that of generics by approxi-
mately 40 percent in 1993. Although generics gradually penetrated markets
before the incentive pricing policy was implemented, the process was slow
and seldom complete. When the policy change took place in 1994:2, few
brand-name ﬁrms matched generic prices, and the rate of generic drug uti-
lization rose to the neighborhood of 80 to 90 percent.
The Long Shadow of Patent Expiration 271
Fig. 8C.1 Average of brand’s share of markets grouped by year subject to 
generic competitionA reservation price technique for capturing the impact of generics is
probably better suited to deal with the discontinuity of ﬁnancial incentives
that occurs under an incentive pricing policy. For purchases made without
such incentives (e.g., prior to the Pharmacare policy change), would the real
revealed preferences be revealed under either the Feenstra or the Griliches
and Cockburn method? Probably not.
An increasing number of insurance companies, pharmacy beneﬁts man-
agers, and health maintenance organizations in the United States are using
incentive pricing policies to encourage generic drug utilization (Aventis
2000; Scott-Levin 2001). However, it is not clear if uninsured individuals are
always aware of the generic option. In a recent survey of American con-
sumers, 87 percent said they would choose a generic drug if it would save
them money, yet fewer than half reported having been presented with the
choice when purchasing drugs (Flemming 1999). Given the mix of ﬁnancial
incentives and product knowledge at the individual level, aggregate price
and quantity observations are diﬃcult—if not impossible—to interpret.
Berndt, Kyle, and Ling oﬀer us an important, detailed description of ﬁrm
behaviors when products are in their sunset phase, as well as a thought-
provoking comparison of the indexes that economists might otherwise use
to measure the impact of ﬁrm behaviors. Four times they caution readers
about the diﬃculty of interpreting cost-of-living measures in the pharma-
ceutical sector due to the nonstandard ﬁnancial incentives of consumers
and potential imperfections in the physicians’ agency role. Unfortunately,
most readers, even trained economists, beg the welfare-theoretic question
when they read price index results. Berndt, Kyle, and Ling rightfully (I be-
lieve) conclude that for measurement theorists and statistical agencies to
address the welfare-theoretic question head-on, we do not necessarily need
more sophisticated econometric techniques; we require better models of the
principal agent relationships in the pharmaceutical sector and better
sources of data. Even the detailed data sources employed by Berndt, Kyle,
and Ling suﬀer from the fact that ﬁnancial incentives are a dog’s breakfast
in the market as a whole. I believe the best future research in this area will
probably come from drug-plan speciﬁc databases. With such databases, one
can be (more) certain of consumers’ ﬁnancial incentives and tailor the price
indexes accordingly.
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